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1. INTRODUCTION
Students of post-war Less Developed Country economic advance-
ment will not be surprised to find that the next tiger to spring from the
developing world will likely be an Asian species. Thailand is a nation
of 51 million people with a per capita income of $726 in 1985.' It is
the eighteenth largest country in the world, the thirty-second in trade,
and the thirty-first in Gross National Product (GNP).' While it has
yet to match the economic successes of the four Newly Industrialized
Countries (NICs)-Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singa-
pore-Thailand is increasingly being touted as Asia's fifth tiger, or the
Newly Agroindustrializing Country (NAC) among NICs.3
Thailand has reached the approximate level of development of Ko-
rea and Taiwan fifteen years ago,4 and is also outperforming its dy-
namic Southeast Asian neighbors. Thai economic growth of 4% in 1985
was the best in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and in 1986 and 1987, while other nations were experiencing reces-
sions, Thailand's GNP growth rates were 4% and 6.5% respectively.5
* J.D. Candidate 1990, University of Pennsylvania; B.A. 1985, Tufts University.
] STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., RE-
PORT OF A STAFF STUDY MISSION TO KOREA, TAIWAN, HONG KONG, CHINA, THAI-
LAND, SINGAPORE, AND INDONESIA (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter STAFF STUDY].
2Id. at 17.
s See Janssen, A Slower But Surer Species Of Asian Tiger, ASIAN BUSINESS,
June 1988, at 72, 75 [hereinafter Surer Species]. Janssen notes that Thailand, because
of its large agricultural base and its position as the only net food exporting nation in
Asia, may follow a different course of development than the NICs, whose manufactur-
ing products have led their export-oriented growth more than the agricultural and ser-
vice sectors. Id.
4 STAFF STUDY, supra note 1, at 2.
5 Id. at 17. See also Surer Species, supra note 3, at 72.
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Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
After a three-year decline in the nation's trade deficit, the deficit nearly
tripled in the first half of 1987, due to an increase in imports which
reflected the continued recovery of the domestic economy from a two-
year economic adjustment in 1984-86.1 Foreign exchange reserves rose
to $5.2 million in 1987, and Thailand's external debt levelled off at
about $1.4 billion.7
The United States has benefitted from this growth, as evidenced
by a 29% increase of U.S. exports to Thailand in the first six months of
1987.8 American investors also appear welcome, as they are entitled to
national treatment under the United States-Thailand Treaty on Amity
and Economic Relations,9 which is currently in force.' ° A recent poll
indicated that the foreign business community in Thailand is satisfied
with, and optimistic about, the Thai investment climate.11 The number
of applications to Thailand's Board of Investment rose to 1,058 in 1987
from 431 in 1986.1" The United States currently ranks third in overall
investment in Thailand."
Individuals familiar with third world economic success models will
not be surprised that widespread piracy of U.S. copyrights, patents and
trademarks has accompanied the growth of the Thai economy. In the
past, piracy of intellectual property has acted as a rough barometer of
economic progress, as developing pirate countries seeking a shortcut to
economic prosperity, have clashed with developed countries-primarily
the United States-that seek respect for their property rights. Tony
6 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, AND DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 1987 NATIONAL TRADE ESTI-
MATES REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (1987), at 307 [hereinafter NATIONAL
TRADE ESTIMATES]. Thailand's trade deficit measured $224 million in the first half of
1986, and $596 million in the first half of 1987. Id.
I Surer Species, supra note 3, at 72. Janssen attributes this levelling-off to an
increase in Thai business' willingness to borrow domestically due to a drop in interest
rates. Id.
Central to the recent success of the Thai economy has been the government's pol-
icy of tying the baht to the dollar. As the value of the dollar has declined, the low-cost
baht has made Thai exports cheaper to buy abroad, and has helped to boost domestic
tourism. It has also meant increased investment from Japan and Taiwan, as well as the
three other tigers. Although the baht Was untied from the dollar in 1984 and attached
to a basket of currencies, the Thais have ensured that this basket contains about 80-
90% dollars. Id. at 72-73.
s NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATES, supra note 6, at 307. United States exports had
previously risen from $849 million in 1985 to $936 million in 1986. Id.
I Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, May 29, 1966, United States-Thai-
land, 19 U.S.T. 5843, T.I.A.S. No.6540.
10 See STAFF STUDY, supra note 1, at 17.
a See NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATES, supra note 6, at 307.
1 Surer Species, supra note 3, at 73.
18 Interview with Supavud Saichueua, Economic Officer, Royal Thai Embassy,
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 6, 1989) [hereinafter Embassy Interview].
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Gurka, managing director of Commercial and Trademark Services, a
Hong Kong-based group that identifies counterfeiting in Asia, has
noted the path which pirate goods have followed in the post-war era.
"In the late 1960s, Hong Kong took over the role Japan held in the
late 1950s as 'copycat of the world.' Then in the late 1970s, it was
Taiwan's turn, and right now, Thailand is about to burst into the fake
export scene." 4 Indeed, the Asian Pacific Chambers of Commerce re-
cently ranked Thailand as the worst country in the region in respecting
intellectual property rights.15
The success of Thailand, the four tigers, and other soon-to-be-
booming Asian economies, plus the mounting U.S. trade deficit, has
made the infringement of U.S. intellectual property a hotly disputed
regional trade issue. In response to the problem, the U.S. government
now considers intellectual property piracy as a major trading issue."
United States action to combat piracy has included bilateral and multi-
lateral efforts. The United States has initiated bilateral negotiations,
where through the use of threats of revocation of benefits under the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)1" and institution of unfair
trade practices actions under Section 301 of the Trade and Tariff Act
of 1984,'" it has attempted to engender domestic statutory reform in
pirating nations. On the multilateral front, the United States has led
the effort at the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)"' to bring national intellectual property laws
within the GATT's proscriptions of trade barriers.20
"' Caplan, Counterfeiting Asians Under Siege, ASIAN Bus., May 1988, at 16, 17
[hereinafter Counterfeiting Asians]. Experts have also noted that counterfeit watch-
makers have been shifting entire factories to Thailand. J. Com., Aug. 23, 1988 at 4A,
col. 2. Moreover, representatives of various industries have remarked on this shift. Jo-
seph E. Hart, Vice President and Managing Director of ATT-Thailand, a subsidiary
of American Telegraph and Telephone, has stated that Bangkok has become the
"piracy and counterfeiting capital of the world." Williams, Thai Producers Grapple
With Growing Piracy, L.A. Times, March 14, 1988, at 1, col. 4 [hereinafter Thai
Producers]. Also, Kim Durgen, a spokeswoman for Levi-Strauss, has recently stated
that "Thailand is the one country where we continue to have problems with counter-
feiting because of the absence of strict controls." Barmash, Companies Report Progress
Against Counterfeit Goods, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1988, at DI, col. 1.
" Holstein, Asia's Export Upstarts Face High Winds From Washington, Busi-
NESS WEEK, Nov. 7, 1988, at 52 [hereinafter. Asian Upstarts].
16 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
STRENGTHENING WORLDWIDE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
GAO/NSIAD-87-65 (1987) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
17 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-66 (1988).
'a 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (1988). See infra notes 76-87.
11 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 27
U.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter GATT].
'0 See infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text. The principal multilateral intel-
lectual property organization is the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
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While U.S. bilateral attempts to engender reform of domestic stat-
utes have worked in other Asian countries,2" the path towards statutory
reform in Thailand has been tortuous. Indeed, in April 1988, Thai
Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda dissolved his cabinet after a gov-
ernment dispute over unpopular proposed copyright legislation." At
that time, authorities in the field of international copyright noted that
they were "not aware of any other government being so strongly af-
fected by a copyright issue."2 The Thais recently failed to provide ade-
quate and effective protection for U.S. intellectual property rights
before a U.S.-imposed December 15, 1988 deadline. As a result, the
United States, on the last full day of the Reagan administration, an-
nounced a cut of $165 million in Thailand's GSP benefits.
24
a 116-member organization whose function is to promote intellectual property protec-
tion and encourage investment, industrialization, and international trade. GAO RE-
PORT, supra note 16, at 22. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment has also served as a multilateral forum for discussion of intellectual property
rights. Id. WIPO aims to strengthen intellectual property systems through its advisory
services and education and training efforts; it also administers 17 multilateral "unions"
composed of countries that adhere to specific agreements on intellectual property. Id. at
24 (listing the agreements).
Among the agreements WIPO administers is the Berne Convention For The Pro-
tection Of Literary And Artistic Works. The Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works of Sept. 9, 1886, completed at Paris, on May 4, 1896,
revised at Berlin on Nov. 13, 1908, completed at Berne on March 20, 1914 and revised
at Rome on June 2, 1928, at Brussels on June 26, 1948, at Stockholm on July 14,
1967, and at Paris on July 24, 1971, effective July 10, 1974 [hereinafter Berne Con-
vention], reprinted in 7 COPYRIGHT 135 (1971) and in M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT
1003 (1976).
Although the United States' recent signing of the Berne Convention has diffused
somewhat the debate over copyright protection in Thailand, see infra notes 116-19 and
accompanying text, and although WIPO is the best known multilateral forum in the
intellectual property area, the United States has decided for a number of reasons that
the GATT is a more effective vehicle for engendering intellectual property protection at
the multilateral level. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text. But see infra,
notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
21 See Tachuk, Pirating Intellectual Property, CANADIAN BUSINEss REVIEW,
Summer 1987, at 19 [hereinafter Pirating]. Tachuk notes that as a result of U.S. ef-
forts, Singapore in 1987 was about to apply a new copyright law, Malaysia had just
completed a draft copyright law to accompany new patent and trademark statutes,
South Korea had enacted legislation in December 1986 to establish a comprehensive
copyright and patent system, and Taiwan had broadened its copyright and patent laws
and proposed new trademark legislation. Id., at 19-20.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1988, at 5, col. 1; Bangkok Post, Apr. 30, 1988, at 1, col.
4.
28 International Update, 4 COPYRIGHT L. J. 95 (1988).
2' N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1989, at D1, col.4. In addition to denying benefits under
the GSP'system for Thai imports to the United States totalling $165 million, the
United States revoked several waivers permitting Thailand to ship more products than
usual. Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Denies Thailand Duty-
Free Benefits On Imports Worth $165 million (Jan. 19, 1989), at 30. This decision is
expected to affect $8.3 million in Thai exports of jewelry, telegraphic and telephonic
connection equipment, rice meal and flour, and dried mung beans. Id.
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Application of the bilateral program has strained relations be-
tween Thailand and the United States and is a major source of friction.
Given the important security relationship between the two countries,
the fact that Thailand and ASEAN as a whole favor participation in a
capitalist world economic order, and that increasing trade between the
United States and Thailand would lead to many mutual benefits, it is
worth considering whether alternatives to the U.S. bilateral strategy ex-
ist which.would bring about more comprehensive protection in a less
visible and antagonistic manner. Such a strategy would allow the
United States to realize its goal of better protection by a means more
suitable to the amicableness of our relations.
This Comment will discuss, first, the nature and scope of the pi-
rate goods problem in Thailand. Second, it will summarize the U.S.
bilateral program for combatting world-wide piracy and current efforts
to make inadequate national intellectual property protection cognizable
under the GATT. Third, it will discuss the consequences of U.S. use of
unilateral trade measures to engender statutory reform in Thailand.
Last, it will indicate whether alternatives to the U.S. bilateral program
exist that are capable of addressing the piracy problem in the short and
long term.
2. NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
2.1. The Scope of Pirating Activities
2.1.1. Global Effects of Piracy
Studies on trademark counterfeiting have found eighty-two U.S.
firms with combined losses of almost $50 million in sales to counterfeit-
ing in 1982.25 The International Intellectual Property Alliance esti-
mated in 1985 that piracy of copyrighted works in ten selected coun-
tries costs U.S. industry $1 billion in lost sales annually. 8 The
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association reported that as of June
1985, one of its companies lost $27 million in potential sales of one
25 GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 15, (citing The Effects of Foreign Product
Counterfeiting on United States Industry, USITO Pub. No. 1479 (1984) [hereinafter
ITC Study]). This study defines trademark counterfeiting as the distribution of goods
bearing unauthorized copies of U.S. trademarks. Id.
" Id. at 15. The International Intellectual Property Alliance is an organization
whose membership includes the Computer Software and Services Industry Association,
American Film Marketing Association, Association of American Publishers, Computer
and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association, International Anticounterfeiting
Coalition, Motion Picture Association of America, National Music Publisher' Associa-
tion, and Recording Industry Association of America. Id. at 15 n.3. Thailand was
among the 10 countries the Alliance identified in its study.
1990]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
product in five developing countries.27 United States industry losses
worldwide have been estimated at $50 billion annually.28
Counterfeiting has also cost U.S. jobs. The U.S. Commerce De-
partment's International Trade Commission has approximated that in
1982, 131,000 U.S. jobs were lost due to product counterfeiting.29
2.1.2. Magnitude of Piracy in Thailand
Estimated losses to U.S. industry from piracy in Thailand reflect
the gravity of the global problem. The Recording Industry Association
of America has estimated that over 90% of the Thai market is captured
by pirated products. 0 Moreover, a recording industry representative
was denied permission to establish an office in Bangkok for enforce-
ment purposes.31  Computer programs such as Lotus 1-2-3,
WordPerfect, Ventura, and dBase, which all cost over $400 in the
United States, sell in Bangkok for around $35.32
The impact of fake products on sales of pharmaceutical goods is
particularly evident. Pfizer International Corporation has stated that it
earned $2.2 million in 1984 on twelve of the U.S.-patented products it
sells in Thailand, while fakes of the same products earned other com-
panies $4.2 million in the same period.33 SmithKline Beecham esti-
mated that its sales in Thailand in 1986 would have been $7.6 million
had it not been for counterfeiting. This figure contrasts sharply with
the $2.7 million SmithKline Beecham estimated for actual sales in that
year.
3 4
2.2. Thai Patent, Trademark and Copyright Protection
Experts have suggested that Thailand is particularly well suited to
27 Id at 15.
28 Counterfeiting Asians, supra note 14, at 16.
29 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (citing ITC Study, supra note 25).
"o STAFF OF HOUSE SUBcOMM. ON OVERSIGHTS AND INVESTIGATION OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., SELECTED
PROBLEMS IN 5 FAR EAST COUNTRIES 9 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter PROBLEM
COUrTRIES].
S1 Id.
22 Asian Upstarts, supra note 15, at 52.
32 White, Thailand's Drug-Copying Companies Keep Prices Down, Upset For-
eign Finns, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1986, at 25, col.2.
31 Id. Industry officials have also noted other problems in the area of pharmaceu-
tical goods. Foreign producers seeking to introduce new drugs to Thailand must submit
a formula to Thai regulatory officials for approval. "Somehow that formula often leaks
out to Thai producers before marketing approval is granted to the foreign firm." Thai
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production of counterfeit goods because of its stable currency and its
labor force, which is among the cheapest in Asia."5 However, the main
reason for the shift to Thailand is the standard of Thai patent, copy-
right and trademark protection. Thailand's patent law was enacted in
1979." The Patent Act gives protection to inventions for a period of
fifteen years from the application filing date while product designs are
protected for seven years after the application filing date.37 The Patent
Act also provides for compulsory licenses if, after three years from the
grant of a patent, there has been, for no legitimate reason, neither pro-
duction of a patented product nor application of the patented process in
Thailand.8 Compulsory licenses are also provided if, for no legitimate
reason, there has been no sale of the patented product or if a sale has
been at "unreasonably high prices or such sales do not meet the public
demand." 9
The Patent Act also contains numerous exclusions, including food
and pharmaceutical products, pharmaceutical ingredients, agricultural
machinery, plant or biological processes, scientific or mathematical
rules and theories, and computer programs.40 In addition, the statute
proscribes protection for "inventions which are contrary to public or-
der, good morals, or public health or welfare."'41 United States sources
have described the statute as "weak," 42 and list the exceptions, the re-
quirement that a patent holder work the patent in Thailand to avoid
compulsory licensing or cancellation and the case-by-case judicial deter-
mination of what constitutes working the patent as major statutory
shortcomings.43
" J. Com., Aug. 23, 1988, at 4A, col. 2.
3 The Patent Act, B.E. 2522 A.D. 1979, reprinted in 82 PATENT AND TRADE-
MARK REVIEW 278 (1984). The English translations of the Thai patent, copyright, and
trademark statutes are also available in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COUNSELLORS THAI-
LAND, THAILAND BUSINESS LEGAL HANDBOOK 108 (7th ed. 1987) [hereinafter LEGAL
HANDBOOK].
37 LEGAL HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at 110.
SS Id. at 111.
3 Id. at 111.
40 Id. at 109. The issue of the protection computer software should receive has
been one of the most contentious points in the current United States-Thailand trade
dispute.
41 Id.
PROBLEM COUNTRIES, supra note 30, at 9.
4 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATES, supra note 6, at 311. Exporting and selling a
product through an agent has been interpreted as satisfying the requirement that a
patent holder work the patent in Thailand. See id. at 311.
Pharmaceutical industry sources have commented further on the protection ac-
corded under the patent statute. "We have process protection in Thailand, but it's
worthless. The burden of proof of [process patent] infringement is on us." INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Nov. 11, 1988, at 11 (statement of industry official). Drug patent holders also
argue that it is easy for foreign infringers to copy a patented process used to make a
1990]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
Thailand's Trademark Act" provides protection and registration
requirements for Thai and foreign trademarks. Provisions of the Thai
Penal Code also provide some protection and impose criminal liability
on trademark infringers.
4 5
Trademark registration is effective for ten years, and after expira-
tion, the owner of trademark may apply for renewal."' Trademarks
may be challenged and a court may invalidate them for non-use.' 7
Remedies under the Trademark Act include imprisonment for one
year or a fine of not more than 10,000 baht.' 8 The Act, however, does
not address the legal action that the owner of a registered trademark
may 'take against an infringer; the owner must, therefore, rely on reme-
dies under the Civil and Commercial Code and under the Penal
Code.4 Section 420 of the* Civil and Commercial Code provides the
owner of a registered trademark with a civil action for compensation.50
Sections 273-75 of the Penal Code provide criminal penalties of three
years imprisonment and a fine of not more than 6,000 baht, or impris-
onment for one year or a fine of not more than 2,000 baht, depending
on the type of violation.51
The United States -considers the Trademark Act deficient since it
does not protect service, certification, or well-known marks.52 United
States observers have also noted that enforcement of the law is poor and
that the penalties under the Trademark Act are "relatively low." 53
The source of protection for foreign copyrights is an issue of cur-
rent Thai-U.S. negotiations. The Thai parliament has also addressed
this issue." Parties to the current United States-Thailand debate have
cited three sources of potential protection for domestic and foreign
copyrights in Thailand: the Copyright Act,5" The Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,56 and the 1966 United
drug and "add a slight twist to the process to avoid infringement." Id.
"' The Trademark Act, B.E. 2474 (1931), as amended by The Trademark Act,
B.E. 2504 (1961), translated in LEGAL HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 118-23.
"I LEGAL HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 118-19.
46 Id. at 121.
47 Id. at 122.
48 Id. Ten thousand baht is about $390.
49 Id.
50 Id.
"' Id. at 123. Six thousand baht is approximately $240. Two thousand baht is
about $80.
See NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATES, supra note 6, at 311.
PROBLEM CouNTRIES, supra note 30, at 9.
See infra notes 100-129 and accompanying text.
The Copyright Act, B.E. 2521 (1978), translated in LEGAL HANDBOOK,
sispra note 36, at 112-18.
" See supra note 20.
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States-Thailand Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations."
Under the Copyright Act, copyright subsists for the life of the au-
thor plus fifty years in "literary work, dramatic work, artistic work,
musical work, audiovisual material, cinematic film, disseminated sound
or disseminated pictures, or any other works in the fields of literature,
science, or fine arts."" The Act does not specifically mention computer
software.59
Concerning international copyrights, the Copyright Act protects,
subject to Royal Decree, work copyrighted under the national laws of
signatories of international conventions on copyright that Thailand also
has signed.60 The United States has argued that, its membership or
non-membership in the Berne Convention notwithstanding, the 1966
Treaty protects U.S. copyrights. However, until the recent U.S. ap-
proval of the Berne Convention, U.S. authors were not accorded direct
protection, since the 1983 Royal Decree that implemented the Thai
Copyright Act referred only to Berne signatories.61 A Thai court subse-
quently ruled that U.S. authors were not protected under the bilateral
treaty, 2 although works first published in Berne Convention member
countries were protected.
The Copyright Act provides for imprisonment as punishment for
infringement and contains a number of fines for violations of the rights
to reproduction and adaptation or for publicizing without permission.6"
The Copyright Act also proscribes contributory infringement and al-
lows a copyright owner to bring a civil action for any damages that
exceed the amount of the fine he or she receives."
5 See supra note 9.
OS LEGAL HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 112, 117.
" Id. at 112; PROBLEM COUNTRIES, supra note 30, at 9.
60 LEGAL HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 116. Thailand is a signatory to the
Berne Convention. The United States has recently amended its copyright law in order
to join the Berne Convention. This fact has defused the debate over the amount of
protection to be accorded to United States copyrights. See infra note 88 and accompa-
nying text.
61 PROBLEM COUNTRIES, supra note 30, at 9. Article V, Sec. 2 of the 1966 treaty
provides:
Nationals and companies of either Party shall have within the territories
of the other Party the same right as nationals and companies of the other
Party in regard to patents for inventions, trade marks, trade names, de-
signs and copyright in literary and artistic works, upon compliance with
the applicable laws and regulations, if any.
19 U.S.T. at 5850.
:2 PROBLEM COUNTRIES, supra note 30 at 9.
63 See LEGAL HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 117-18 (setting forth the amount of
the fines).
4 Id. at 118.
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3. TRADE-BASED METHODS To COMBAT PIRATE GOODS
3.1. Bilateral Efforts: The Trade and Tariff Act of 1974
As noted previously,65 protection of intellectual property is a prior-
ity component of U.S. trade policy. In 1984, the United States insti-
tuted a policy of encouraging host-country statutory reform through bi-
lateral negotiations and the threat of unilateral trade measures.
Initially, the International Trade Administration of the Department of
Commerce, together with the Commerce Department's Patent and
Trademark Office, compiled a series of unpublished papers highlight-
ing the problem of piracy in ten countries considered to be the worst
global offenders.6" Information from these reports was used to compile
the United States Trade Representative's (USTR) Annual Report on
National Trade Estimates required by the Trade and Tariff Act of
1984. 7 This report was subsequently used in a general review of the
GSP.68
The United States then focused its attention on priority cases. Pri-
orities were defined with two principles in mind: that reduction in in-
ternational piracy be engendered through efforts to reduce the produc-
tion of pirated goods rather than through efforts to reduce the access of
these goods to foreign markets; and, that attention be concentrated ini-
tially on the worst offenders.69 The USTR commented at the outset of
the program that it would attempt to influence regional infringement
practices by picking a country and making an example of it.7 0 If the
target nation was able to attract more foreign investment after re-
forming its laws, the United States would use the target nation's posi-
tive experience to demonstrate the benefits of increased protection to
65 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
66 GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 40. Thailand was one of the 10 countries the
Commerce Department identified.
17 Id. at 41.
" Id. The GSP allows certain developing countries to import certain commodities
duty-free in order to encourage developing country national economic progress. Briefly,
it operates in the following manner. The United States applies two sets of criteria when
evaluating whether a country is to participate in the GSP program. First, it applies
mandatory criteria pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 2462(b) (1988) which renders ineligible for
trade benefits Communist governments and governments that nationalize United States
property. Second, the President applies discretionary criteria pursuant to 19 U.S.C
2462(c) (1988), where the President "takes into account" "the extent to which such
country is providing adequate and effective means under its laws for foreign nationals
to secure, to exercise, and to enforce exclusive rights in intellectual property, including
patents, trademarks, and copyrights." See Four Pacific Rim Nations Are Graduated
From GSP Status, 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 282 (1988).
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other nations in the region.
The United States then commenced, in a number of specific cases,
a process of persuasion where it emphasized the positive consequences
of stronger laws." These included: attracting foreign investment; en-
couraging the transfer of technology; encouraging licensing agreements;
promoting beneficial subcontracting relationships; improving the target
nation's reputation and visibility as a supplier; and protecting consum-
ers in the target country. The United States has also held education
and training seminars.
74
Absent significant progress by these means, the United States, re-
sorts to unilateral trade action. Unilateral action generally can take two
forms: the threat of revocation of benefits under the GSP program and
the threat of the initiation of an unfair trade practices action under
Section 301 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1974, as amended in
1984.Y
The U.S. System of Preferences was enacted in 1974 and allows
the United States to designate certain products as eligible for duty-free
entry into the United States. It is intended to promote economic devel-
opment in developing countries." In 1984, the GSP was amended to
include among its list of objectives the provision of "effective means
under which foreign nationals may secure, exercise and enforce exclu-
sive intellectual property rights '7 7 in recipient nations. Specifically, the
1984 Act amended Section 502(b) of the 1974 Act by making intellec-
tual property protection a mandatory criteria for the grant of benefits. 8
It also included intellectual property protection in the discretionary cri-
71 Id.
72 Id.
71 Address by Eileen Hill, International Economist, International Trade Adminis-
tration, United States Department of Commerce, Institute of Public Policy Studies,
University of Michigan (Mar. 13, 1987) [hereinafter Hill Speech].
" GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 45. The United States conducted seminars on
copyright protection in Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia in 1985. Id.
"The provisions of the 1974 Trade Act concerning the Generalized System of
Preferences are contained at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-66 (1988). The provisions concerning
the enforcement of United States rights under trade agreements and response to certain
foreign trade practices are codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (1988). For information on
the 1984 amendments to the Trade Act see generally Comment, Toward Negotiating a
Remedy to Copyright Piracy in Singapore, 7 Nw. U. J. INT'L. LAW & Bus. 561, 577-
83 (1986) [hereinafter Singapore].
76 See generally Singapore, supra note 75, at 576.
- 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1988) (Statement of Purpose of 1984 Amendment). See also
GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 47-48. Previously, the criteria for eligibility included
the level of national economic development, the extent to which other nations were
undertaking comparable efforts, and the impact of granting GSP status on U.S. produc-
ers only. 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1982).
78 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(4)(A) (1988).
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teria the President may consider when deciding whether a country
qualifies for participation. 9 The Act requires the President to conduct
periodic reviews of the program to determine a country's "competitive
need limitations" and requires the President to cut benefits if the bene-
ficiary nation reaches a certain level of competitiveness.8 0 The President
may, however, waive the competitive need limitation for certain articles
if he deems a waiver to be in the national interest.8" When considering
the decision, the President must give "great weight" to a country's pro-
tection of copyrights, patents, and trademarks.8 2
The 1984 amendments also authorize the USTR, on its own initi-
ative, to institute an unfair business practices case under Section 301 of
the 1974 Trade Act,8" the consequences of which are more serious to a
target nation's economy than the revocation of GSP benefits. Section
301, as amended, gives the President sweeping power to enforce U.S.
rights under any trade agreement or to respond to foreign trade prac-
tices that are "unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and bur-
den[] or restrict[] United States commerce." 8 The 1984 amendments
specifically include inadequate intellectual property protection as
within the scope of "unjustifiable" or "unreasonable" trade practices.8"
Section 301 has proved effective in the past. After the United
States initiated an investigation under Section 301 in 1985 against
South Korea, the Koreans agreed to provide better protection for U.S.
patents-particularly chemicals and pharmaceutical goods-and copy-
rights.8 The Koreans would have faced retaliatory trade measures if
the action had not been settled. 7
3.2. Multilateral Action through the GATT
The United States has also focused on the GATT as a multilateral
method of strengthening protection of intellectual property.88 The
United States initiated discussions on the issue within the GATT
79 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(5) (1988).
80 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c)(1), (2)(A), (2)(B) (1988).
81 19 U.S.C. § 2464(3)(A) (1988).
82 19 U.S.C. § 2464(3)(B)(ii) (1988).
83 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (1988).
19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1988).
85 19 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(3)(B) (1988).
86 See Anderson, Intellectual Property: Foreign Pirates Worry U.S. Firms,
CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS, Sept. 9, 1986, at 8, 11.
87 Id.
88 For information concerning the history and purposes of the GATT, see gener-
ally J.M. FINGER AND A. OLECHOWSKi, THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK ON
THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, (1987) [hereinafter GATT HAND-
BOOK], and Ehrenhaft, A U.S. View of the GATT, 14 INT'L Bus. LAW 146 (1986).
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framework at the end of the Tokyo Round, '9 emphasizing its prefer-
ence for the enactment of a code to prevent trade in counterfeit trade-
mark goods.90 The United States prepared a draft of the code, which
was never submitted to the GATT membership for consideration."'
The Uruguay Round is the eighth and most recent round of
GATT talks.9 2 At the outset of the Uruguay Round in an April, 1986
policy statement, the United States outlined two proposals for action on
intellectual property. First, the United States indicated its intention to
work towards the completion and implementation of an anticounterfeit-
ing code to eliminate the market for the import of counterfeit trade-
mark goods.9" Second, the United States declared that it would work to
conclude an agreement to combat intellectual property practices that
distort international trade. 9' Subsequently, intellectual property negoti-
ations were included among the topics for consideration at the Uruguay
Round.
The United States believes the GATT provides a more effective
vehicle for reform than existing multilateral bodies, including the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 5 Two reasons ac-
count for this view. First, the GATT procedures for adopting new
measures are more fluid than other international bodies because most
GATT nations have not formed voting blocs due to their varying eco-
nomic interests in the wide range of subjects that the GATT encom-
passes.9 8 Also, GATT obligations are embedded in codes, to which ad-
herence is optional.97 The chances of general approval and maximum
participation in codes are good because of the wide bargaining that
comprises the approval process.9 " Second, GATT dispute settlement
procedures are considered better than the procedures in WIPO, where
the International Court of Justice adjudicates the aggrieved party's
complaints."9
s GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 35.
80 Id.
91 Id.
' See Farnsworth, Brazil and India fight New Copyright Rules, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 6, 1988, at D2, col. 5. Trade ministers from member countries most recently met
in Montreal in December, 1988.
'a GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 35.
" Office of the United States Trade Representative, Administration Statement on
the Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property Rights Abroad, Apr. 7, 1986, quoted in
GATT HANDBOOK, supra note 88, at 206 n.1.
, See supra notes 16-20, and accompanying text.
, GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 36.
7 Id.
98 Id.
9 Id. at 37.
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4. APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES BILATERAL STRATEGY
To THAILAND.
By the time the United States began to exert pressure on Thailand
to change its laws, U.S. bilateral action had already brought about re-
form in role model countries Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore."' 0
In addition, the United States had made progress towards reform in
Malaysia and Indonesia."'
The United States initially applied its policy of persuasion in the
Thai context by conducting a seminar on the problem in Thailand in
early 1985.02 It then began to threaten to institute unilateral trade
measures in response to continued failure by the Thais to provide better
protection. The areas on which the United States has focused are com-
puter software, where the United States seeks copyright protection, and
pharmaceutical goods, where the United States seeks interim patent
protection until the Thais can amend their patent law.
The threat of GSP revocation was the initial trade measure the
United States utilized, 0 ' and it announced a cut in benefits of $165
million on January 19, 1989.104 Moreover, the prospect of a threatened
Section 301 trade action on either the issue of computer software or
drug patents has surfaced. However, the United States has not made a
specific proposal.
1 0 5
One development the United States may not have anticipated was
the gravity of the domestic political consequences that followed Ameri-
can attempts to force former Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda to
submit copyright reform legislation to the Thai House of Representa-
tives. Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila recently noted that Thai-
land and the United States are on a "collision course" as a result of the
inadequacy of patent and copyright statutes as they apply to computer
100 Pirating, supra note 21, at 19.
101 Counterfeiting Asians, supra note 14, at 20.
102 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
103 See Sikes, Thai Copyright Issue May Topple Government, J. Com., Apr. 21,
1988, at 8A, col. 2 [hereinafter Sikes]. In 1987 Thailand ranked seventh in the world in
receipt of GSP benefits with sales to the United States worth $550 million. J. Com.,
Aug. 23, 1988, at 4A, col. 2.
104 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Before the cut in GSP benefits was
announced, Thai Commerce Ministry and Embassy officials projected that a cut could
potentially cover items worth $300-360 million a year. Bangkok Post, Dec. 22, 1988, at
1, col. 1. Based on mid-year trade statistics, the Thai Farmer's Bank estimated that a
cut of this magnitude would have caused Thai exporters to pay $48.4 million in import
tariffs, a figure which would represent 3.4% of the value of total Thai exports to the
United States (which totaled $1.4 billion in 1988). Id. Nonetheless, advisors to Thai
Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan had estimated that they did not expect the cut
to be so large. Id.
105 Bangkok Post, Dec. 22, 1988 at 1, col. 2.
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software and drug patents.1 0 6 This statement and the recent U.S. deci-
sion on GSP benefits followed a year of attempts by the United States
to have the Thais enact stronger legislation, and of attempts by the
Thai government to push an unpopular Copyright Amendments Bill
through the Thai legislature.
4.1. Legislative Action on the Copyright Amendments Bill
In June 1987, the Cabinet of Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda
was forced to postpone debate on the Copyright Amendments Bill to
avert a political conflict with a well-organized opposition, including
members of the Prime Minister's ruling Democratic Party."° The bill
was intended to satisfy U.S. industry concerns, expressed through the
United States government, that the Thai statutes did not provide ade-
quate penalties for copyright violations and that the Thai government
was not aggressive enough in enforcing copyright protection.08 Despite
the opposition, Prime Minister Prem was obligated, in part by U.S.
threats at trade retaliation, to submit the Copyright Amendments Bill
to the Thai legislature in April 1988.
Members of the Democratic Party January 10 dissidents had ex-
pressed their intention to oppose the bill even before House considera-
tion. 9 Despite the opposition of thirty-one members of the January 10
dissidents in the Democratic Party, and of the other members of the
opposition, the Copyright Amendments Bill was approved by the
House on April 28, 1988 by a vote of 183-134."10 Prime Minister Prem
nevertheless dissolved his Cabinet and Parliament that day after sixteen
Democrat ministers, led by Deputy Prime Minister Bhichai Rattakul,
resigned because "they could not control" the dissidents.11 The move
to dissolve the legislature nullified the recently-enacted copyright legis-
lation.11 2 At the time of dissolution, the King's Royal Decree also an-
nounced a general legislative election for July 24, 1988.11
The dissolution of Parliament proved to be only one step in a con-
tentious political struggle. After the July elections, the new Prime Min-
ister, Chatichai Choonhavan, announced, after holding talks with U.S.
100 Asian Upstarts, supra note 15, at 52.
107 See Sikes, supra note 103, at 8A.
108 Thailand Rushing to Draft Patent, Copyright Rules under U.S. Threat, 6
INSIDE U.S. TRADE 2 (1988) [hereinafter Thailand Rushing].
109 Bangkok Post, Apr. 20, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
110 Bangkok Post, Apr. 29, 1988, at 1. col. 1.
"I Bangkok Post, Apr. 30, 1988, at 1, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1988, at 5,
col. 1 (quoting Democrat Party Secretary General Sanan Kachornprasat).
"" Bangkok Post, Apr. 30, 1988, at 1, col. 6.
113 Id.
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Commerce Secretary William Verity, that he would reintroduce the
Copyright Amendments Bill.11 4 Predictably, public debate over the is-
sue again became heated.11 United States and Thai negotiators met
twice while the Thais redrafted the Copyright Amendments Bill. The
first round of these discussions occurred in Hawaii in November 1988,
and the second round convened in Washington in December. By the
time of the November meetings in Hawaii, tension over the copyright
issue appeared to have eased in view of the adoption of the Berne Con-
vention by the United States. 16 Nevertheless, the extent of protection
that the United States would receive under the Convention and draft
reform laws and the issue of retroactive protection for U.S. copyrights
remained unresolved.1 17 Moreover, the two nations were still far apart
on the issue of protection of U.S.-patented drugs. The United States at
the beginning of November had rejected, on the grounds that the term
of protection was too short, a Thai proposal to protect U.S. pharmaceu-
tical goods until the Thais could address the politically sensitive patent
issue by statutory reform. 1 ' Finally, the nations still disagreed on the
categorization of computer software, with the Thais citing a recent Ju-
dicial Council ruling that software is a scientific work entitled to patent
protection, and the United States maintaining that software is a literary
work entitled to protection under the copyright law. 19
Substantive disagreement over the scope of copyright and patent
protection and political posturing persisted as the December talks ap-
proached.120 The Thais continued to argue that an amendment to the
114 Bangkok Post, Sept. 19, 1988, at 3, col. 1.
See Bangkok Post, Sept. 20, 1988, at 6, col. I (editorial supporting reform of
the copyright laws); Bangkok Post, Sept. 20, 1988, at 5, col. 1 (indicating student oppo-
sition to reform); Bangkok Post, Sept. 24, 1988, at 4, col. 2 (op-ed piece opposing
reform); Bangkok Post, Oct. 1, 1988, at 5, col. 2 (letters to the editor in support of
better protection of intellectual property).
11" See supra note 60 and accompanying text. See also Bangkok Post, Nov. 10,
1988, at 32, col. 1 (indicating Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan's view that both
parties appeared after the Hawaii talks to have a better understanding of the issues);
Thailand Rushing, supra note 108, at 2 (indicating that the adoption by the United
States of the Berne Convention was expected to ease Thailand's burden of providing
protection).
11" Thailand Rushing, supra note 108, at 2. At the meeting, the United States
also expected Thailand to increase penalties for violations and to provide greater en-
forcement of its laws. Id. See also Bangkok Post, Oct. 26, 1988, at 32, col. 1.
118 Thailand and U.S. Still Far Apart on Patent Protection as Deadline Nears,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 11, 1988, at 10.
119 Bangkok Post, Nov. 11, 1988, at 15, col. 6.
120 See Bangkok Post, Nov. 18, 1988, at 3, col. 1 (indicating that a visiting delega-
tion of United States Senators to Bangkok expressed the United States' intention to
"push hard" on the protection of intellectual property). See also Bangkok Post, Dec. 1,
1988, at 4, col. 1 (statement of Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan that Thai inter-
ests will be protected at the talks with United States officials).
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copyright statute was not needed in view of the United States approval
of the Berne Convention.121 The United States, however, still remained
doubtful over the level of protection to be provided 22 and awaited clari-
fication of the Thai position on the issue of translation rights and
length of protection. 2
These issues, however, were minor compared to the continuing
disagreement over protection of computer software and interim patent
protection for pharmaceutical goods. The United States argued that
software should be protected under the copyright law, 2" but the Thais
rejected U.S. demands that the Copyright Amendments Bill include
such protection. 2 5 Consequently, the prospect of a Section 301 action
surfaced.
1 26
With respect to pharmaceutical goods, the Thais indicated their
willingness to implement temporary measures by using Public Health
Ministry regulations to provide protection for one year, and their pre-
disposition to await the outcome of the Uruguay Round before com-
mencing further discussions on patents. 27 The United States, however,
sought tougher interim protection until new patent legislation could be
enacted.' 28 After the December negotiations, Thailand indicated that it
would maintain its position despite any revocation of GSP benefits.
29
4.2. Sources of Thai Opposition
Dissident members of the Democrat Party and other opponents of
reform have proffered numerous reasons why passage of the Copyright
Amendments Bill and more generally, the enactment of more compre-
hensive intellectual property protection, would not serve Thailand's na-
tional interests. Participants in the Thai debate and commentators on
the advantages of protection for developing nations have justified their
positions on legal, economic, and nationalist grounds.
The main legal objection to the Copyright Amendments Bill was
that it contravened Article 162 of the Thai Constitution.' Specifically,
opponents argued that the Constitution unambiguously states that any
121 Bangkok Post, Nov. 17, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
122 Bangkok Post, Nov. 23, 1988, at 30, col. 6.
... Bangkok Post, Nov. 17, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
1. Bangkok Post, Nov. 11, 1988, at 15, col. 2.
128 Bangkok Post, Dec. 10, 1988, at 3, col. 5.
116 See Bangkok Post, Dec. 20, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
117 Bangkok Post, Nov. 11, 1988, at 15, col. 2; Embassy Interview, supra note 13.
128 Bangkok Post, Nov. 11, 1988, at 15, col. 2.
129 See Bangkok Post, Dec. 14, 1988, at 3, col. 8.
10 Surin Pitsuwan, Copyright Bill Now More of a "Political Plaything," Bang-
kok Post, Apr. 28, 1988, at 6, col. 3 [hereinafter Political Plaything].
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treaty-in this case the 1966 Treaty of Amity and Friendship between
the United States and Thailand"' 3-that needs legislation to define and
fulfill the treaty's obligations requires the approval of a joint session of
Parliament. 2 The 1966 Treaty, however, received no such joint ap-
proval, since it was signed and ratified by the revolutionary government
of Field Marshall Thanom Kittikachorn without having been approved
by the national legislature.' According to this view, the Copyright
Amendment Bill was, therefore, ahead of the Constitutional process.1
3 4
Other objections to both the legislation and to stronger protection
in general were grounded in the view that protection of foreign rights
would not serve Thai development interests.' 5  Dr. Surakiart
Sathirathai, a law professor at Chulalongkorn University and an advi-
sor to Prime Minister Chatichai, has stated, "Let's be frank. To give
absolute protection under a copyright system would do no good for the
Thai scientific community. Much of what we do in science is derivative
[of foreign products] but contributes to the welfare of the country. We
have to provide certain mechanisms for fairness to the Thai public."'3 6
... See supra note 9.
133 Political Plaything, supra note 130.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 The issue of protection of intellectual property rights has in the past been
viewed as a North/South issue and commentators have put forth the economic argu-
ment against patent protection on numerous occasions. See generally Greer, The Case
Against Patent Systems In Less-Developed Countries, 8 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 223
(1973) (arguing that the purposes of patent protection-encouraging the creation of
new inventions-are not served by LDC protection of foreign patents since the creation
of inventions in advanced countries does not depend on LDC markets, and since only
some instances of transfer of technology to less developed nations are patent dependent);
Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or
Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831 (1987) [hereinafter International Patent System] (arguing
that the traditional rationale for patent protection in developed nations does not apply
to developing countries). Professor Oddi, however, recognizes that we are in a period of
"patent ascendancy," where many developing nations feel that participation in the in-
ternational economic system will promote economic development. Id. at 836.
The United States emphasizes the benefits of better protection in the course of
consultations as part of its bilateral strategy. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying
text. Commentators have also noted that the position of Asian nations as producers of
knowledge as well as consumers has contributed to a growing acceptance of intellectual
property rights. See generally Altbach, Economic Progress Brings Copyright to Asia,
FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 3, 1988, at 62, 63 [hereinafter Altbach, Economic Progress];
Altbach, Toward a Worldwide Copyright Era, PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY, Dec. 11, 1987,
at 44 [hereinafter Altbach, Copyright Era].
"" Thai Producers, supra note 14, at 9. Dr. Surakiart's comments echo the senti-
ment of some Western commentators, who have offered a "stages of development" ar-
gument. According to this view, "[i]ndustrial development requires, at some stage, the
copying of ideas and inventions already available." Counterfeiting Asians, supra note
14, at 17 (statement of Hong Kong University Lecturer Michael Pendleton).
The United States has emphasized that it believes this view has its limits, and that
good laws and enforcement practices are a necessary step to development. See Hill
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Development rationales similarly underlie the debates over
whether computer software should qualify for copyright or for patent
protection, and whether patent protection should be granted for for-
eign-patented drugs. On the computer issue, opponents of copyright
protection for software have argued that software should be patentable
since, after expiration of the statutory period of patent, the information
supplied in the patent registration enters the public domain. The Thais
could then use the information and the product to develop their own
technology. If software was protected by copyright, not only would the
applicant for protection not have to supply technical information upon
registration, but the term of protection would be much longer-life plus
50 years. 187 With respect to drugs, opponents of patent protection note
that Thailand is a largely rural community which is primarily self-
medicated since access to doctors is difficult.1"8 Production in violation
of the patent holders' rights in the United States is justified, therefore,
on public health policy grounds.'39
The most vocal opposition to reform has come from those parties
who believe that passage of new legislation would amount to an unpa-
triotic caving-in to U.S. demands. At the height of the debate over the
Copyright Amendment Bill, Mr. Surin Pitsuwan, a member of parlia-
ment who was also a member of a scrutinizing committee assembled to
approve the bill before submission to the House, noted that the contro-
versy over the bill had less to do with its merits than its politics.' Mr.
Surin also noted that proponents of the bill have been accused of being
traitors, betraying the Thai nation on an issue of "national honour."''
Speech, supra note 73, at 13. It cites two examples and offers one explanation for its
view. First, the United States has noted that Japan improved its laws over 30 years ago
to attract cutting-edge technology and to concentrate its research efforts on developing
new technology. Second, the United States has noted that where domestic laws have
been weakened, such as in Britain in the 1950s when patent protection was suspended,
the country became less competitive globally. Last, the United States has noted that
lack of protection hurts domestic authors, since if there is protection only for domestic
products and pirating of foreign works, the price of domestic works will be more than
the foreign goods. The foreign goods will, therefore, take over some of the domestic
market from domestic goods. See id. at 13-15.
137 Embassy Interview, supra note 13.
1.8 Id. This fact is attributable both to the number of doctors (the ratio of doctors
to the general population is relatively low) and to the lack of access to doctors in many
rural areas. Id.
139 Id. Other explanations for the opposition to the copyright bill place noticeably
less emphasis on the public benefits to be derived from greater access to technology, and
in the case of patents and trademarks, to cheaper goods. Owners of pirate industries
appear to have much political influence. See generally Counterfeiting Asians, supra
note 14, at 20.
140 See Political Plaything, supra note 130.
141 Id. See also Surin Pitsuwan, Democrat MP Recounts Battle Over Copyright,
Bangkok Post, Apr. 30, 1988, at 6, col. 2.
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Opposition to reform based on arguments of state sovereignty has con-
tinued throughout the escalating trade dispute.
1 42
In addition to the perception among certain Thai constituencies
that the United States is engaged in an insulting process of browbeat-
ing, opposition is founded on the view that the United States lacks the
moral imperative to force young industrializing nations to abandon pi-
rate production. Proponents of this view note that the United States
pirated many goods from Western Europe, particularly England, dur-
ing the 19th century.14 3 Moreover, they have remarked at the inordi-
nate amount of time it took the United States to join the Berne Conven-
tion and at its reasons for opposing the convention until recently. 1 4
Other opponents have stated that copyright is a western concept
"which was created to maintain a monopoly over the protection and
distribution of knowledge and knowledge-based products. 1 45 These
critics note that copyright is not part of Asian cultural traditions but is
imposed on Asian nations by their advanced country trading
142 See sources cited supra note 115.
143 See Counterfeiting Asians, supra note 14, at 17. "For most of our first century
of nationhood, we were takers.... We stole what others created. Nobody could match
us in our disdain for the rights of foreign authors such as Dickens, Thackeray or Gil-
bert and Sullivan . . . ." Thai Producers, supra note 14, at 9 (statement of former
United States Secretary of Commerce William Verity).
Michael Pendleton, a lecturer at Hong Kong University, an expert on intellectual
property law, and an editor of a specialist publication entitled IP ASIA has also noted
that "[nlight up until 1955 the [United States] didn't recognize foreign copyright."
Counterfeiting Asians, supra note 14, at 17.
144 ASIAN BUSINESs has observed that a February 1988 press release issued by the
United States stated that "[O]pposition to joining has, in part, been based on the belief
that it (the Berne Convention) provides too much protection." Counterfeiting Asians,
supra note 14, at 17.
Thai observers have also noted that it is curious that the United States has not
better understood and accommodated the domestic Thai political difficulties, which
have accompanied the issue, in view of the politics of the United States' delay in adopt-
ing the Berne Convention. Embassy Interview, supra note 13. Some Thais acknowl-
edge that the United States took so long to join Berne because joining the convention
would require amendment of the manufacturing clause, the clause in United States
copyright law which links copyright protection to the manufacture of copies of certain
works in the United States. Id. See generally, A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN, AND J. GINS-
BURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES (1985) [hereinafter GORMAN]; Note, Abandon
Restrictions, All Ye Who Enter: The New United States Copyright Law and the Berne
Convention, 9 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 455, 469-71 (1977). The Thais note that the
clause owes its existence to the United States government's failure to combat the power-
ful domestic printing industry, which had urged strongly the enactment of what many
would characterize as protectionist legislation. Embassy Interview, supra note 13. See
also GORMAN, supra note 144, at 300-02.
145 Altbach, Economic Progress, supra note 135, at 43. In the 19th century En-
glish philosopher John Stuart Mill defined copyright as a device for protecting knowl-
edge monopolies of the "haves" against the real educational, cultural and scientific
needs of the underdeveloped world. Id.
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partners.
1 46
4.3. Consequences of Unilateral Trade Measures
The U.S. use of unilateral trade sanctions has caused some indi-
viduals in Thailand to argue for a reorientation of the Thai develop-
ment strategy away from the United States. 147 Two features of U.S.
regional economic and security policy also appear to foster this senti-
ment. First, the United States is in many ways still viewed with suspi-
cion after it backed out of its support of South Vietnam. 48 These par-
ties question whether or not the Thais should depend on the United
States as an ally. Second, opponents of reform have noted that the
United States recently graduated Taiwan and Singapore from benefits
under the GSP program despite the progress that these countries had
made on intellectual property rights. 49
Continuation of a strained relationship between the United States
and Thailand would be undesirable in view of the increased prospects
for bilateral trade. 5 ' Moreover, the United States also has an interest
in further cultivating friendly relations in an area of the third world
which, as a result of the prosperity it has enjoyed under a world eco-
nomic order dominated by the United States, is more consistently pro-
American than other regions of the third world.
Finally, it appears that the very difficulty Thailand has encoun-
tered over reform of its domestic law may be due in part to a healthy
state of democratic institutions in that nation. While other nations in
the region have been able to adopt effective protection in a relatively
short period of time, the obstacles to quick passage in Thailand may be
the result of the ability of the Thai opposition to use the parliamentary
process to voice its concerns institutionally. The United States may
want to encourage this process even if it slows down reform.'
5. SOURCES OF RECONCILIATION
As a result of lax protection in Thailand and of the United States'
use of unilateral trade measures, relations between the two nations
have strained. On the one hand, American groups ranging from indus-
try to Congress to the Executive have become angered, in the context of
148 Id. at 63.
14' Embassy Interview, supra note 13.
148 Id.
149 See Four Pacific Rim Nations Are Graduated From GSP Status, 35 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 283 (Feb. 11, 1988).
10 See supra notes 6-13.
11 Embassy Interview, supra note 13.
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a mounting U.S. trade deficit and cries that American industry can no
longer compete globally, with what they perceive to be a basic affront
to U.S. property rights. On the other hand, those favoring reform on
the Thai side have had to address legitimate economic arguments con-
cerning the desirability of protection, politically powerful groups op-
posed to reform, and too much partisan nationalist sentiment.
However, resolution of the issue would produce many benefits for
both nations. An optimal solution would be one which protects U.S.
property interests and allows Thai supporters of reform to accommo-
date their development needs and domestic constituencies.
5.1. The GATT as an Alternative to the Bilateral Program.
The GATT initially holds the promise of a compromise solution.
The U.S. decision to work through the GATT evidences the American
view that the GATT will be an effective anti-piracy measure in the
long term. Moreover, resolution of the issue through GATT mecha-
nisms would be more acceptable to the Thais, as reform opponents
could not claim that the United States is singling out Thailand for un-
fair treatment.
While the GATT may offer promise for the future, however, it is
not an acceptable means of protecting U.S. interests in the short term.
It is highly unlikely that any new codes will come into existence before
1990, when the Uruguay Round talks are scheduled to conclude.152
The Uruguay Round's Ministerial Declaration provides, however, a
provision for the enactment of codes which are agreed to during the
course of the Round, but observers have noted that the nations are un-
likely to break precedent and make such a move.' 53
Moreover, a fundamental difference still exists between developed
and developing countries over the propriety of including intellectual
property in the GATT. Many developing countries have argued that
WIPO is the more appropriate forum for resolution of this issue. This
argument surfaced in the ministerial talks in Montreal, where Brazil
and India have led a group of developing nations in blocking progress
on a U.S. proposal for a broad program. '"
5.2. Joint Ventures between Thai and American Producers
Reconciliation might also be served by joint ventures between Thai
152 See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 37.
23 Id.
154 See Nordic Countries Try to Break Deadlock on Covering Intellectual Prop-
erty in GATT, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No.202 (Oct. 19, 1988).
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producers and American rights-holders. Under such arrangements,
U.S. rights-holders who market their goods in Thailand could enter
into agreements with Thai producers to produce legitimate articles.
Having entered into contracts to produce legitimate goods, the Thai
producers would then have an incentive to police pirate goods and
might be in a better enforcement position than some U.S. companies
because of the Thai firms' permanent presence in Thailand. Such ar-
rangements have reportedly been used by European firms in the area of
trademarks.155
These arrangements, however, would not be implemented as easily
regarding copyrights or patents. The United States' adoption of the
Berne Convention is expected to bring protection of U.S. copyrights up
to the international standard, thus obviating the need for any such joint
ventures, although enforcement problems may persist. Also, since the
Patent Act specifically excludes pharmaceutical goods from patent pro-
tection,158 firms could not enter into joint ventures.
5.3. Indexing Interim Patent Protection to the Availability of Low-
Cost Pharmaceutical Goods
Another possible source of compromise concerns patent protection
of drugs. While the Americans appear to have accepted the reality that
patent protection is too sensitive a political issue in Thailand to allow
for immediate reform of the Patent Act, the current dispute exists over
the quality of interim protection.157
One method of accommodating American needs for adequate pro-
tection and Thai needs for low-cost drugs would be to index interim
protection for American pharmaceutical goods to the availability of af-
fordable medicine. Many problems, however, exist with such an ap-
proach. First, the United States would be subject to attack from its do-
mestic industry. Second, fashioning such an arrangement for Thailand
might impede efforts to obtain a higher standard of patent protection in
other nations.
5.4. Economic Progress of Thailand
While much pirating activity has been transferred to Thailand as
a result of tightening of statutes in other Asian nations, the shift may
have occurred in part because former pirate nations have experienced
"I Telephone interview with Supavud Saicheua, Economic Advisor to the Royal
Thai Embassy (Feb. 6, 1989).
186 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
157 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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even greater economic success than Thailand. These countries appear
to have followed the model where Asian nations increasingly become
producers as well as consumers of knowledge, and recognize that
knowledge is an international good that needs regulation. 5" Moreover,
commentators have noted that we are in a period of "patent ascen-
dancy," where many developing countries have opted to protect intellec-
tual property and thus participate more fully in the international eco-
nomic system.'59
Waiting for the Thais to reach a level of economic development
where they feel better protection would serve their national interests
does not, however, present a valid policy option in view of the strong
domestic consensus in the United States that piracy must stop now.
6. CONCLUSION
The increasing acceptance of intellectual property protection in
many nations suggests that the piracy problem, at least as it exists in
Southeast Asia, will at some point become a thing of the past. °60 In the
short term, however, both sides to the current negotiations are account-
able to mobilized political forces.
Even if Thailand and the United States agree that protection in
the future should be more comprehensive, they will continue to differ
over when better protective measures should be instituted. Fortunately,
the nations will continue to discuss the problem against a backdrop of
agreeable relations and of greater worldwide movement towards protec-
tion of intellectual property.
18 See Altbach, Economic Progress, supra note 135, at 63. Japan has even been a
leader, along with the United States, in promoting measures in the GATT to protect
intellectual property. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
159 See International Patent System, supra note 135, at 836.
16 See generally Altbach, Copyright Era, supra note 135, at 44; Altbach, Eco-
nomic Progress, supra note 135, at 62.
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